

2018

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Conference Report (CR-2018-1)
6 January 2018

Managing Editor: Diane N. Labrosse
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Report on *The INF Treaty of 1987: A Re-Appraisal, International Conference European Academy Berlin*, 30 November-2 December 2017

<https://www.berlinerkolleg.com/de/inf-treaty-1987-re-appraisal>

URL: <http://tiny.cc/CR-2018-1>

Report by **Stephan Kieninger**, Ph.D., Independent Historian, Mannheim

From 30 November to 2 December 2017, the Berlin Center for Cold War Studies, the Institute for Contemporary History Munich-Berlin, and the Chair for Contemporary History at Mannheim University hosted the conference “The INF-Treaty of 1987: A Re-Appraisal” at the European Academy in Berlin. The Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung, the Bundeskanzler Willy-Brandt Stiftung, and Humboldt University Berlin supported the conference as co-hosts.

The conference opened with a keynote address by **Bernd Greiner** (Berlin Center for Cold War Studies) on the emergence of mutual trust and its relevance as a precondition for the conclusion of the INF Treaty of 1987. The meeting included a public panel discussion at Humboldt University that focused on the current debates on INF Treaty compliance. Over the course of the three-day conference (which was conducted in English), European and American experts discussed the origins of the treaty, its terms, as well as its implications on the basis of newly accessible sources. While the INF treaty had far reaching implications, the archival blocking period has so far precluded source-based analysis. The conference was a kick-start to providing fresh insights and newly formulated ideas on the INF treaty and its international impact in the late Cold War.

The panelists bound Eastern and Western perspectives together, and the last panel of the conference highlighted the pivotal relevance of the verification and implementation process following the conclusion of the treaty, a subject largely ignored in the historical literature. It goes without saying that the entire conference was closely related to the current debates over the INF Treaty; in recent years, both the United States and Russia have alleged the other has violated the INF Treaty. Many defense analysts argue that the thirty-year-old treaty is in danger of unraveling. There was consensus among the participants that it is of utmost importance to maintain the INF Treaty as a cornerstone of global cooperative security.

Keynote Lecture

Wolfram Hoppenstedt (Bundeskanzler Willy-Brandt Stiftung, Berlin) welcomed the participants on behalf of the organizers. The conference started with Greiner’s keynote lecture on the international context of the INF Treaty. Its main theme was the relevance of trust as a precondition for the conclusion of the Treaty. Greiner

depicted the Cold War as a history of mutual mistrust, pointing out that the War was a hotbed for distrust simply because distrust is either the offspring or twin, in any case a close relative, of fear. Greiner looked into the evolution of nuclear strategy and Mutual Assured Destruction as well as into concepts of preemptive nuclear war, arguing that the Revolution in Military Affairs spurred fantasies of limited nuclear options. As a case in point, he expounded on President Richard Nixon's and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's madman approach and the efforts of the two men to use nuclear weapons a political weapon trying to intimidate the Soviet Union by ordering the U.S. military to full global war readiness alert during the Vietnam War.

Greiner portrayed Kissinger's 1961 book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*¹ as a template of U.S. nuclear weapons policy since the Kennedy Administration, as well as of how the Nixon Administration conducted the war in Vietnam. In fact, Kissinger's book was an intellectual attack on the Eisenhower Administration's policy of responding to Soviet aggression "by means and at places of our choosing."² Whereas Eisenhower aimed to prevent U.S. involvement in conflicts on the Soviet Empire's periphery, Kissinger advocated, and subsequent administrations emphasized, helping U.S. allies resist local aggression. Greiner pointed out that Kissinger understood America and the USSR to be locked in a matrix of choices by their equal desires to maximize gains and minimize losses, and hence believed that they axiomatically shared an interest in moderation. This book assumed that everyone understood war in the same way. Greiner emphasized that readers would find Kissinger's description of the conduct of operations of "limited nuclear war" reminiscent of his conduct of the Vietnam War.

Greiner then highlighted the relevance of U.S.-Soviet Cold War arms control agreements as a means to stimulate mutual trust despite the escalation of the global Cold War. Yet, as Greiner pointed out, the loopholes in the US-Soviet arms control process prevented the emergence of trust in more sustainable ways until the last years of the Cold War. Finally, Greiner argued that ideological controversies in themselves do not suffice as a basis for understanding the dynamics of both trust and distrust. Concluding his keynote lecture he suggested a clear-cut assumption: If any single factor captures the essence of the Cold War, it is nuclear weapons.

Panel 1: Turning Points until 1985

Leopoldo Nuti's (University of Roma Tre) presentation focused on the periodization of the Euromissile Crisis and its interpretation against the backdrop of broader historiographical trends that have emerged in the last decade or so. Nuti argued that an appropriate understanding of the crisis necessitates a broader, longer term perspective and a look in a different historical framework. He pointed out that the most common approach is to look at the crisis as the Western reply to the Soviet decision to modernize its arsenal by introducing SS-20s. Nuti emphasized the need to overcome the traditional challenge-and-response paradigm that assumes aggressive Soviet behavior and the cumbersome, yet ultimately effective, reply by a peaceful and somewhat tardy Western alliance: After all, NATO's debate about the modernization of its own nuclear forces preceded, and did not follow, the discovery that the Soviets had been deploying their own new IRBMs (Intermediate-

¹ Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper Publishers, 1957).

² John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," Address before the Council of Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y., U.S. Department of State, Press Release No. 81 (12 January 1954).

Range Ballistic Missiles). Nuti reiterated the fact that even at the peak of détente there were forces in both camps which remained highly uneasy about accepting coexistence and which kept finding ways to retain a qualitative or quantitative edge against the adversary, even at the highest moment of strategic parity. Therefore, the Cold War was far from over. Nuti thus suggested that scholars ought to reconceptualize the way we look at—and interpret—the whole period of détente.

The second part of Nuti's presentation was devoted to broader historiographical trends which have emerged in the last decade or so. Nuti underlined the fact that more and more historians have put significant emphasis on the importance of the 1970s as a decade of upheaval, which had a major transformational impact on the international system. Such an approach, in all its different aspects, has somewhat reduced the importance of the end of the Cold War by placing it inside into a longer, and larger, historical trend—namely the end of the rigid bipolarity of the early cold war years and the emergence of a looser, less structured international system entailing a plurality of state and non-state actors. In conclusion, Nuti stressed that both the Euromissile Crisis as well as the conclusion of the INF Treaty took place at a highly volatile moment in the evolution of the international system, one in which the old cold-war paradigm was coexisting—and was overlapping—with the emergence of a distinctly different pattern of international relations.

Beth Fischer (University of Toronto) investigated the reasons for the Reagan Administration's shift to a more cooperative approach toward the Soviet Union. How was it that the president who introduced the largest peace-time military build in US history also concluded the only treaty to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons? How did we get from the "evil empire" to the INF Treaty in only four short years? Fischer depicted a tale of "new thinking" and leadership, not only in the Soviet Union, but also in the United States. She emphasized that the multiple crisis of 1983 prompted Ronald Reagan to reconsider both the execution and substance of U.S. policy toward the USSR. Fischer particularly stressed the impact of Reagan's nuclear abolitionism: Reagan reconceptualised "security:" Soviet communism was not the main enemy, he argued, nuclear weapons were. The United States and the Soviet Union needed to work together to rid the world of these arsenals. President Reagan sought to move from mutually assured destruction to mutually assured survival.

At the same time, Fischer pointed out that Reagan failed to communicate U.S. policy objectives effectively. Moreover, Reagan's foreign-policy making process was poorly organized and was undermined by both ideological battles and personal animosity among the principal advisers. Most of his advisers steadfastly opposed his desire to eliminate nuclear weapons. They therefore dismissed his ideas about nuclear security as fanciful. Thus, Fischer emphasized that the emergence of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was all the more important. Both Reagan and Gorbachev understood that they needed each other in their efforts to achieve lasting arms control progress. Nuclear disarmament was not something that could be accomplished unilaterally. Both also understood that mistrust was the root of the problem. "We don't mistrust each other because we are armed," Reagan was fond of saying. "We are armed because we mistrust each other."³ The summit meetings in Geneva (1985) and Reykjavik (1986) were intended to build such trust. This mutual desire to rid the world of the threat of nuclear annihilation formed the foundation upon which the Cold War was peacefully concluded.

³ Ronald Reagan, Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, 12 June 1987, see <https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1987/061287d.htm>, accessed 4 January 2018.

Tom Blanton (National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.) explored Gorbachev's role and the change in the USSR's nuclear policy, focusing on the interactivity in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the outset of his presentation, Blanton emphasized that Soviet policy had already changed dramatically before Gorbachev came to power in March 1985. As early as the mid-1970s, Soviet General Staff war planners had come to the realization that a nuclear war in Europe would negate the advantages of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact's conventional forces over NATO, and indeed make impossible any conventional war-fighting along the lines of long-standing Pact plans (Czechoslovak forces reaching Lyon, France on the ninth day, for example). This new military understanding, however, could not surface as stated Soviet policy given the primacy of Communist Party doctrine about winning any conflict with imperialist capitalism. Formal military scenarios were thus required to posit "victory" rather than reality. Blanton pointed out that the crisis of U.S.-Soviet relations restricted the new Soviet military analysis against nuclear war-fighting to the confines of the General Staff planners—until the coming of Gorbachev in March 1985.

Marshall Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff, saw in 1985 the opportunity to reconcile Party doctrine with military reality. Akhromeyev and Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Georgy Kornienko developed a nuclear abolition program—one rather transparently meant to retain Soviet conventional superiority and get rid of the West's European nuclear weapons, particularly the Pershings II deployed in 1983 that looked to the Soviets as the ultimate decapitation weapon. Reagan played a key role in the surfacing of the new Soviet approach through his interaction with Gorbachev at their first summit in Geneva, in November 1985. In 1986, Gorbachev publicly announced the Soviet nuclear abolition program. Reagan took the nuclear abolition proposal very seriously, but ultimately shied away from expressing his fulsome support. Thus, Blanton argued that as of spring 1986, the two ships had passed in the night, even though both actually shared, at the highest level, a commitment to getting rid of nuclear weapons.

Public Panel Discussion at Humboldt University: The INF Treaty of 1987: Disarmament is no Fantasy

The first day of the conference concluded with a public roundtable discussion, moderated by **Bernd Greiner**, at Humboldt University. Participants included **Susanne Baumann** (Foreign Office, Deputy Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control), **Oliver Meier** (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs), **Otfried Nassauer** (Berliner Informationszentrum für Transatlantische Sicherheit), **Andreas Wirsching** (Institute for Contemporary History Munich-Berlin).

The discussion focused on the historical significance of the INF Treaty as a confidence and security-building measure. The Treaty was conceived as a gate opener for further cooperative security agreements entailing reductions in both strategic arms as well as conventional forces in Europe. The panelists emphasized the relevance of verification and on-site inspections as a key component for the success of the INF Treaty. At the time of its signature, the Treaty's verification regime was the most detailed and stringent in the history of nuclear arms control, designed both to eliminate all declared INF systems entirely within three years of the Treaty's entry into force and to ensure compliance with the total ban on possession and use of these missiles.

In terms of the current INF Treaty compliance debates, Oliver Meier pointed to the dangers arising from advances in nuclear technology on the one hand and the deterioration of political relations between NATO and Russia on the other. Otfried Nassauer highlighted the impact of long-standing mutual enemy images on both sides. He emphasized the interconnection between the change in Russia's security policy over the last 20 years and the lack of forward-looking concepts of cooperative security in Europe. Andreas Wirsching looked

into the emergence of trust-building elements in East-West relations during the second half of the 1980s, highlighting the importance of personal factors such as Ronald Reagan's and Mikhail Gorbachev's common pursuit of cooperative security policies. Moreover, he emphasized the impact of the peace movement, as its public initiatives triggered the emergence of a public discourse on arms control. Susanne Baumann related these findings to the current debates on the INF Treaty and the German Government's arms control policy: She pointed out that disarmament and arms control were central elements of the architecture of global security. They were not concerns of the past, but pressing challenges for the present and future. She underlined the importance of the United Nations as a forum in which to build trust between states through a global multilateral disarmament dialogue.

Panel II. Breakthrough to Disarmament: From Reykjavik to Washington, 1986-1987

Ronald Granieri (Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia) provided an assessment of the parallelism between both the rearmament and disarmament dimension of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy. Granieri's paper was aimed at contributing to a post-revisionist understanding of the late Cold War Era (for want of a better term). Granieri emphasized the contradictions in Reagan's foreign policy: On the one hand, Reagan wanted America's victory in the battle with the Soviet Union. On the other, Reagan wanted to abolish nuclear weapons, and reducing nuclear weapons required patient statecraft and the relaunch of U.S.-Soviet cooperation. These contradictions were there not by default but by intention, Granieri pointed out: taking them into account was necessary to understand the twists and turns in the Reagan Administration's diplomacy.

Granieri stressed that the "real Reagan" was actually serious when he said that the point of strength was to become strong enough to negotiate when the time was right, and he assembled a team of advisers who made that possible. For all their occasionally intense disagreements on details, those advisers who worked with Reagan the longest, including the pair most often described as polar opposites, Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, did so because they shared an overall strategy for advancing American interests, one in which a military buildup and an arms control strategy were intimately bound together. A central element of that strategy was Reagan's deep aversion to nuclear weapons, which distinguished him from other conservatives who advocated strength and who distrusted arms control. This is what led Reagan to embrace the "zero option," something he advocated for all nuclear weapons and which eventually found expression in the INF Treaty.

Svetlana Savranskaya (National Security Archive, Washington D.C.) provided a paper on the Soviet road to the INF Treaty, investigating Mikhail Gorbachev's arms control policy in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations. Savranskaya focused on the significant evolution of Gorbachev's thinking in three years from his election as General Secretary in March 1985 to the moment in December 1987 when he signed the INF Treaty with Ronald Reagan in Washington. The change in his policy was reflected in the radical turn in the Soviet negotiating positions. Savranskaya looked into several factors that help explain this intellectual and political journey: Gorbachev's learning and opening his mind to new arms control ideas from experts/advisers, the shock of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in April 1986, successful interactions with Western leaders who became Gorbachev's partners in ending the Cold War, and the receptive military, who, in the person of Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, supported deep reductions in nuclear armaments and even abolition of nuclear weapons.

Savranskaya argued that Gorbachev and the reformers in the Politburo managed to isolate the decision making on INF from conservative elements in the leadership. Thus, Gorbachev was in a position to deliver major concessions in order to produce a real breakthrough in arms control, which he saw as the first step toward his goal of nuclear abolition. At the same time, however, Gorbachev's arms control policy created the first split between the reformist political leadership and the military, who felt manipulated by the General Secretary and who never fully supported the unequal nature of the reductions. Still, as Savranskaya pointed out, the completion of the INF Treaty allowed the Soviet Union and the United States to establish an unprecedented regime of verification, leading to open discussions on short-range and tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, the INF Treaty paved the way for comprehensive negotiations on deep reductions of strategic armaments leading to the signing of the START Treaty in July 1991.

Panel III. Socio-Political Dynamics, Peace Protests, and Public Debates

Claudia Kemper (University of Gießen/Hamburg Institute for Social Research) looked into peace protests and public debates in the United States. She emphasized that the emergence of the U.S.-peace movement was strongly connected with the FREEZE-Resolution, put forward by a broad and moderate campaign in the early 1980s. Certainly, the term "Freeze" became popular due to its simple message. However, it disappeared after the conclusion of the INF treaty. Kemper argued that the Freeze movement continued to have an impact despite the disappearance of the term "freeze." Rather, the debates over the "peace-term" served as an important synthesis of ideas, critiques, and fears. The peace movement triggered new debates on alternative security concepts that were a key part of anti-nuclear debates. Thus, from the perspective of the peace movement, the INF Treaty was only one part in a longer struggle over new policies of cooperative security.

Philipp Gassert (University of Mannheim) examined how the surprising turn in international affairs that led to the 1987 INF Treaty played out on the German domestic scene. The INF Treaty entailed the "double zero solution" including the dismantling of West Germany's own rather aged Pershing Ia missiles that had been deployed during the 1960s. Gassert pointed out that Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl had long resisted abandoning the Pershing Ia. Eventually, Gassert argued, both domestic considerations as well as international pressure contributed to Kohl's turn to support for the INF Treaty. Domestically, the Chancellor was faced with a potential parliamentary majority in favor of radical steps toward disarmament, reflecting the country's majoritarian public opinion. Kohl announced his support for the double-zero solution in a press conference on 26 August 1987, thereby overruling the more conservative elements of his government. Gassert highlighted, the fact that Kohl was a pragmatic centrist politician comparable to Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Gassert pointed out that Kohl's reversal was indeed a 180-degree turnaround. In the spring of 1987, the same West German government had very confidently announced that the German Pershing Ias were in no way connected to the Geneva INF negotiations and that they could not become the subject of a treaty between the superpowers. This expectation turned out to be quite erroneous. In early August of 1987, Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze very pointedly asked how it could be that the Federal Republic was interloping in Soviet-American negotiations, thereby threatening the successful conclusion of a historic disarmament treaty. If the superpowers agreed to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons, those striking within the 500 to 5.000 km range, the Pershing Ias, with a scope of 720 km, would have to go to as well.

Tapio Jutunen (University of Tampere) investigated the reception of the Euromissile Crisis and the INF Treaty in the Nordic countries. Jutunen pointed out that the peace protests and the overall anti-nuclear public opinion arguably had an effect on foreign policy there. For instance, the opposition parties in

Denmark, holding a majority in Folketing, pushed the Danish center-right minority government to the so-called 'footnote policy' between 1982 and 1988 when Denmark added several reservations on its participation to NATO's operations and procedures. The effect of the 'footnote policy' started to lose its meaning only after the signing of the INF Treaty and the 1988 parliamentary elections in Denmark.

Moreover, Jutunen stressed the fact that the protests in Nordic countries also embraced a positive agenda. During the early 1980s, over one million Finns and over two million Scandinavians altogether signed the petition to establish a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone (NNFZ). The NNFZ agenda formed a practical policy process that was used as a framework for discussions over cooperative security between Nordic countries themselves (with minimal interference from external parties). Moreover, it provided a positive agenda that tied together the interests of the Nordic arms control community, peace researchers and activists, as well as the political parties. The public debates triggered the establishment of peace research Institutes in Oslo, Stockholm and Copenhagen. Thus, as Jutunen pointed out, the NNFZ initiative was an effective way of Track II diplomacy in the Nordic countries.

Panel IV. Reactions of the Western Allies

Oliver Barton (UK Ministry of Defense, London) provided a re-assessment of Britain's attitude towards the INF Treaty. Barton made the point that the immediate reaction of the Thatcher Government to the INF Treaty was mixed. On the one hand, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her officials recognized that the Treaty marked an important breakthrough in East/West relations and a vindication of Thatcher's personal support for Gorbachev and his 'new thinking.' But the INF Treaty dismantled weapon systems on whose deployment the Conservative government had expended significant political capital, and which British officials saw as strengthening NATO's deterrence posture. On balance, Barton pointed out, the price was worth paying to see the elimination of the infamous SS-20. However, for Britain, the INF issue had always been more about maintaining Alliance solidarity, NATO's deterrence credibility, and the UK's independent strategic deterrent than it had been about mitigating the threat posed to Western Europe by Soviet intermediate-range systems or about establishing a supposed Euro-strategic balance.

The second part of Barton's presentation focused on Britain's arms control policy after the conclusion of the INF Treaty. In the months after the December 1987 Washington Summit, Britain felt increasingly dissatisfied with the arms control process. Britain played an important role in facilitating that process. Her Majesty's Government feared that Bonn's push for a far-reaching cut in short-range nuclear weapons could lead to a 'third zero' entailing the elimination of all short-range, battlefield nuclear systems in Europe. In contrast, Thatcher wanted to modernize NATO's short-range systems, not abandon them. For the time being, Thatcher succeeded in seeing off a 'third zero,' but failed to secure modernization. Any 'special' position Britain had held within the Alliance with regard to nuclear arms control was at an end.

Christian Wenkel (Artois University, Arras) investigated France's attitude towards the INF Treaty, highlighting the intricacies of Francois Mitterrand's East-West policy. Wenkel pointed out that French President François Mitterrand always supported the modernization of NATO's deterrent capabilities and the deployment of new Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe. In fact, as Wenkel argued, NATO's INF deployment gave Mitterrand even more leverage to pursue "Ostpolitik à la française." France regained the kind of East-West leadership that it had formerly lost to the Federal Republic. Mitterrand's Moscow visit in June 1984 underpinned his willingness to use the Helsinki Final Act's provisions on confidence and security building measures as a means to facilitate pan-European dialogue. Time and again, Mitterrand highlighted

the French interest in reaching arms control progress through the Helsinki Follow-Up process. He was determined to give the Stockholm Conference the kind of political impulse it needed to produce verifiable and comprehensive confidence building measures.

Wenkel emphasized that Gorbachev's visit to France in October 1985 further underpinned Moscow's special relationship with Paris. It was Gorbachev's first Western journey in his capacity as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The INF Treaty fundamentally changed the context of French Ostpolitik: U.S.-Soviet rapprochement and West Germany's improving relations with Moscow endangered the special role that France had always sought. Thus, in the aftermath of the INF Treaty, Mitterrand offered Gorbachev bold economic assistance as a means to woo him: Mitterrand pledged huge loans in addition to direct Soviet access to the best of French technology. At the same time, Mitterrand saw the INF Treaty as an impulse to deepen Western Europe's integration on the way to a closer monetary union.

Tim Geiger (Institute for Contemporary History Munich-Berlin) shed new light on the West German debate over the "Double-Zero Option" (i.e. the withdrawal of all Soviet and United States Short and Long Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces from Europe) preceding the conclusion of the INF Treaty. Geiger started by looking into Kohl's and Genscher's dual-track policy in NATO up to 1986. Next, he reconstructed the debates about the endorsement of the double-zero solution in the spring of 1987 and about the inclusion of the 72 German Pershing Ia Missiles into the INF agreement in the summer of that year. Moreover, Geiger's presentation highlighted parallels to former and future developments in West Germany's foreign policy, especially regarding the interconnections between NATO's nuclear policy and the question of Germany's division.

Geiger put particular focus on the inconsistencies and paradoxes of West Germany's security policy when the INF Treaty became a possibility in 1987: the Germans were concerned by the arms race and U.S.-Soviet confrontation. However, they were no less worried by the rapid U.S.-Soviet rapprochement and the prospects of the double-zero option. Geiger pointed out that the relaunch of Franco-German cooperation and the announcement of the joint Franco-German brigade in November 1987 have to be seen in this context. Geiger also reiterated that the INF issue caused the Kohl-Genscher Administration to elaborate on an arms control masterplan entailing specific proposals including 50 percent cuts strategic weapons, a global ban on chemical weapons, and negotiations over Short-Range Nuclear Forces. NATO's Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik in June 1987 reflected this program. Last but not least, the dismantling of the 72 West German Pershing Ia missiles contributed to a sustainable improvement of the Federal Republic's bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. West Germany's endorsement of the INF Treaty provided the kind of mutual trust without which Germany's unification would have remained unthinkable.

Panel V. Reactions of the Eastern Allies

Wanda Jarzabek (Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw) shed new light on Poland's stance toward the INF Treaty. She focused on the Polish Communist Party's room to maneuver in its effort to influence the evolution of Gorbachev's arms control policy. Jarzabek expounded on the emergence of the so-called Jaruzelski arms control plans of May 1987 which was in fact a rehash of earlier Polish disarmament initiatives going back to the days of the Rapacki plan, including the obligatory endorsement of existing Soviet nuclear

arms control positions.⁴ Jarzabek pointed out that the proposal was primarily an attempt by Poland to win back for itself the role of Warsaw Pact spokesman on arms control, which it had lost during the early 1980s as a result of its internal problems.

The first two points of the Polish proposal called for the gradual and mutually agreed withdrawal of both nuclear and conventional weapons from Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary (within the Warsaw Pact), and from West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Denmark (within NATO). The third element concerned the reshaping of European military strategies into clearly defensive arrangements. Finally, like many other ideas spawned under the umbrella of the Helsinki agreement on European security, the Polish plan provided for strict but unspecified verification and the expansion of efforts to build confidence and reduce tensions.

Hermann Wentker (Institute for Contemporary History Munich-Berlin) scrutinized East Germany's attitude towards the INF Treaty, pointing out that the policies of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) have to be seen in the context of its relations with the Soviet Union, of its domestic policy, and of its relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. Wentker stressed that the GDR's leadership soon realized that Gorbachev's reform policy could, if transferred to the GDR, threaten not only its power but the very existence of the East German state. Thus, in 1987 the East German leadership distanced itself explicitly from Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policies. At the same time, East Germany's leader Erich Honecker had no problem supporting Gorbachev's arms control approach.

By 1987, Wentker emphasized, East Germany's relations with West Germany's peace movement and its political arm, the Green party, were reduced. Instead, Honecker and the GDR leadership tried to make use of the numerous talks with West German politicians belonging to the governing parties and the Social Democratic Party in order to enlist support for a zero option with respect to the INF and a follow-up treaty up with further disarmament agreements in Central Europe. Although the influence Honecker exercised on the West German government was minimal, his rejoicing was great when the INF Treaty was finally signed. After his return from Washington, Gorbachev initiated a meeting of the First Secretaries on 11 December 1987 in East Berlin. This gave Honecker the opportunity to set himself in the limelight; at the same time the Secretaries publicly signed a treaty on inspections in the context of the INF Treaty between the GDR, the USSR, and the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic (CSSR). This move was intended to persuade the East German public that not only Gorbachev, but also Honecker, had a significant share in the outcome of the negotiations.

Panel VI. Realization of the Treaty

William Alberque (NATO, Brussels) looked into the implementation process of the INF Treaty. His presentation shed new light on the pivotal relevance of the INF Treaty's verification dimension, a subject which is largely ignored in the historical literature. Alberque opened his presentation with a prelude to arms control verification going back to the 1960s, when the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

⁴ Back in 1957, Poland's Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki had used a speech at the UN General Assembly to present a plan for the demilitarization of Central Europe and the establishment of a nuclear-free zone which would include the People's Republic of Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. This area was later extended to Czechoslovakia.

initialed field experiments on Arms Control and Disarmament Measures under the label “Project Cloud Gap.” Next, Albuquerque highlighted NATO’s involvement in the INF negotiations: the INF Treaty was negotiated at NATO before a draft went to the Soviets. Third, Albuquerque expounded on the manifold challenges to implementing the INF Treaty. In January 1988, the Reagan Administration created an on-site inspection agency through a Presidential Directive. It had an annual budget of 120 million U.S. dollars and a staff of 400 missile officers, arms control experts, Soviet language specialists, and highly-qualified experts from a variety of government branches. The on-site inspection agency sent out dozens of teams to inspect 130 Soviet missile sites in various areas across the vast country. The technical talks on the implementation of the INF treaty were eventually conducted on the foreign-minister level from March until May 1988 and entailed specific regulations pertaining to aircraft and crews, inspections procedures, and portal operations. Albuquerque pointed out that the United States’ verification teams conducted 114 inspections in the Soviet Union within the first 60 days. The USSR conducted 52 inspections in the United States. Moreover, the Reagan Administration set up a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, including Missile Launch Notification. Finally, the last INF missiles were scrapped on 31 May 1991.

Oliver Bange (University of Mannheim) investigated the arms control negotiations following the conclusion of the INF Treaty, namely the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Bange first highlighted the fact that the INF Treaty and its implementation issues had a pivotal impact for the two Germanies as non-signatories. Bange stressed that a key element to the implementation procedures was the “territorial principle.” As with the Stockholm agreement on conventional forces and weapons, this regulated that the state on whose territory the weapons were stationed had to make the provisions for the inspections to take place. This allowed East German military experts and politicians a rare glimpse into Soviet barracks with nuclear INF equipment in their own territory— and provided valuable technical and organizational knowledge beyond mere political consulting. This expertise was welcomed by the democratic government of the GDR after March 1990 and by the Federal German government after reunification—and formed a valuable basis for the negotiations on Soviet troop withdrawals.

Next, Bange reiterated that the number of the remaining nuclear missiles was immense: After all, the INF Treaty left untouched Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, as well as Short-Range Missiles: it left untouched 68,000 of the 71,000 nuclear missiles the United States and the Soviet Union possessed. The withdrawal/scraping of INF system left both Germanies exposed to a huge number of weapons while the only strategic deterrent against Soviet territory in case of a war in Central Europe had been abolished. Thus, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe was all the more important for dealing with the deterrence-gap. The CFE Treaty was signed in November 1990 in Paris and formed part of a new political and security structure in Europe—or so one thought at the time. It reduced conventional arms to a critical minimum, creating a “structural inability for offensive action,” while maintaining viable defense capabilities.⁵ The CFE

⁵ The “structural inability for offensive action” is a key concept of Chancellor Willy Brandt’s foreign policy adviser Egon Bahr. It was aimed at the guarantee of military security at considerably lower levels of conventional armaments in Europe. Back in the early 1970s, Bahr proposed mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact eliminating up to 60 per cent of the conventional forces on both sides. For the context, see Oliver Bange, “The German Problem and Security in Europe. Hindrance or Catalyst on the Path to 1980-1990?” in Mark Kramer and Vit Smetana, eds., *Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain. The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945-1990* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 197-210.

negotiations started in early 1990 and were meant to stabilize a potentially asymmetric military situation—before Germany’s unification, the Warsaw Pact’s dissolution, and Soviet withdrawal became feasible.

Concluding his presentation, Bange noticed the current danger that the INF Treaty might unravel. In recent years, both the United States and Russia have alleged the other has violated the Treaty. Recently, the U.S. Senate established an official link between the INF Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty (1992), threatening the abrogation of Open Skies in case of Russian violations of the INF Treaty. Bange emphasized that this might lead to a domino effect and a downward spiral, jeopardizing the entire structure of pan-European security established by the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE). Thus, the existence of the verification centers throughout Europe is threatened. There is a considerable danger that Europe’s security architecture will have to be built from scratch, something that seems almost impossible in the current situation.

Final Discussion

The concluding session on the realization of the INF Treaty was the starting point for the final discussion. Participants pointed out that we were still living with the security structure that was established in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Back at the time, Reagan and Gorbachev created an upward spiral of trust. Today’s downward spiral can only be stopped by creating positive experiences with each other. It is almost impossible to deal with bold questions of nuclear arms control at the outset of prospective negotiations. What is needed are working relations on which both sides can rely. Confidence-building and mutual respect are key elements in such a process. The participants argued that we historians have to sharpen our conceptual tool-kits in an effort to reassess the transformations of the 1980s in a longer-term perspective. So far, the dominant Cold War narrative pits a virtuous United States against the evils of Communism, implying that the United States forced the Soviet Union to succumb. We need more nuanced research on the end of the bipolar order. The conference concluded with the suggestion that the release of new archival evidence would kick-start further research on the INF treaty and its international impact.

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